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Symposium on the Article V
Convention Process

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PEOPLE
Everett McKinley Dirksen*

''WE

I.

THE ISSUE IN PERSPECTIVE

the People," that is the way it began when it was first announced to an anxious public on September 17, 1787.
Those words, the beginning three of our Constitution, introduced
man's finest effort to develop an instrument, a basic charter for selfgovernment. It said to a world that had theretofore denied the people
the right of self-government that at long last man's struggle for
freedom had, in at least one nation, been attained. That document
gave us, as Dr. Franklin said, "A Republic," and the answer to his
query as to whether we can keep it remains a challenge to this day.
How many today stop to consider man's long struggle that preceded the establishment of this Republic? The idea of a republic can
be found expressed in Plato's Politeia (translated as Republic) in
the fourth century B.C., but it was a far cry from that which was
developed at Philadelphia by the delegates assembled in constitutional convention. From Plato's idea of a city-state ruled by a military
and intellectual aristocracy with a philosopher-king as head, we
found expressed in the American and French Revolutions the idea
that a republic constitutes a free state with the rights and liberties
of the individual defined and guaranteed by a ·written constitution.
In the intervening two thousand-odd years we had republics in
various forms and with varying degrees of freedom. The Greek citystates finally gave way to Roman conquest, which brought with it
the Roman concept, as well as the reality, of the republic as a form of
state. The word is derived from res publica, translated as something
which pertains (belongs) to the people, which is the common concern of the people. But this Roman republic did not have any
democratic attributes. Beginning under aristocratic rule, it :finally
terminated with the Caesarean dictatorship that destroyed the republic, but which had ironically come into power with the help of
the popular party.
·with the decline of the Roman Empire, the republic as a form
of government was not again witnessed until late in the Middle
• United States Senator from Illinois.-Ed.
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Ages and occurred as city republics in commercial centers such as
Venice, Antwerp, and Hamburg. But in these city republics the
ruling classes consisted of the clergy and nobility, and those not
of noble birth had no political rights-in fact, the very term "citizen"
had no meaning in this age. As the center of economic development
shifted toward the Atlantic, larger units of government gradually
came into being. They developed as nations rather than free cities,
city-states, or peasant cantons in the Alps. Modern development
began with the independence that the Netherlands gained from
Spain. The English Revolution of the seventeenth century provided
experience for the element of republican tradition and moral rights
in the thirteen colonies. The Declaration of Independence and its
"inalienable rights of man," the French Revolution, and the American War for Independence moved us to the final development of
our republic and the establishment of the Constitution.
It is difficult to conceive of a republic that is other than a free
state with free people participating in the governmental process
through free elections, the outcomes of which are determined solely
on the basis of free discussion. The very term "free state" means a
free exchange of information, ideas, and facts from which responsible
judgments can be made. There must also be present the constitutional right of the people to censure their government at the polls or,
if need be, to change the Constitution so as to alter the form of
government-which right has always in our republic been vested in
the people. This right of the people to decide is founded on the
premise that the decision is based on free discussion among free individuals. Only in this fashion, only so long as this right is retained,
can the people remain sovereign.
Freedom lost is not easily regained. Those who have taken a
right from the people rarely restore it willingly. Throughout our
long history as a nation we have seen the rights of the people protected by our legislatures, both federal and state. We have witnessed
the experimentation and the change that the people have made or
brought about through their legislatures. But always it has been the
people through their legislatures or at the polls that made the
change.
The Supreme Court in the majority opinion in Reynolds v.
Sims1 seemed to recognize the existence and importance of state
legislatures and the necessity of protecting the right of citizens to
I. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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participate in the selection of representatives in the state legislature.
The Court described the process as follows:
State legislatures are, historically, the fountainhead of representative government in this country. A number of them have their roots
in colonial times, and substantially antedate the creation of our
Nation and our Federal Government. In fact, the first formal stirrings of American political independence are to be found, in large
part, in the views and actions of several of the colonial legislative
bodies. With the birth of our National Government, and the adoption and ratification of the Federal Constitution, state legislatures
retained a most important place in our Nation's governmental
structure. But representative government is in essence self-government through the medium of elected representatives of the people,
and each and every citizen has an inalienable right to full and
effective participation in the political processes of his State's legislative bodies. Most citizens can achieve this participation only as
qualified voters through the election of legislators to represent
them. 2
Having reached this conclusion, the Court then seemed to move
away from the principal point at issue, namely, the right of the
people to decide by a majority vote, either in a state-wide referendum or in the manner provided by their state constitution as it
reflects their rights under a republican form of government, the
manner in which the membership in their state legislature shall be
apportioned. How much of that right remains today?
There are many who insist that June 15, 1964, marked the end of
a republican form of government in the states and the beginning of
something quite different, something that is incompatible with the
concept of sovereignty of the people. On that date in a series of cases
beginning with Reynolds v. Sims, the Court assumed unto itself
authority that had theretofore been considered an inherent right
of self-government, which right resided solely in the people of a free
state. The Court in the reapportionment decisions asserted as its
authority power that formerly was vested in the people. By such
action the Court constituted itself a "judiocracy." It turned its back
on over two hundred years of historical and legal fact; it remains to
this day, deaf to the entreaties of those who have been deprived of
their rights. As the rule of June 15 is extended to more and more
governmental units, its effect becomes more widely felt, but the final
results we have not witnessed, only the beginning. The final results
2. Id. at 564-65.
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may well go far beyond anything that the Court majority had in
mind in Reynolds v. Sims.
How did we reach Reynolds v. Sims, what preceded it that would
shed any light on the situation we find ourselves in today, one that
verges on the total destruction of states as instrumentalities of government and the extension of the federal edict throughout the land?
I suppose that the best point of reference would be the Treaty of
Paris, which was signed in the City on the Seine in 1783 and marked
the formal ending of hostilities with Great Britain. It is helpful to
reread that document from time to time, as I do, the better to refresh
my recollection of the authority of our thirteen original states, and
the authority possessed by the other thirty-seven as they became
members of the Union. With the signing of this Treaty of Paris we
became a de jure government; during the period of hostilities, the
thirteen colonies were de facto governments, united in a rebellion
or war against Great Britain. The legal situation was not altered
in the least by the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown. But the first
article of the treaty provides:
His Britannic Majesty acknowledges the said United States, viz.
New-Hampshire, Massachusetts-Bay, Rhode-Island and Providence
Plantations, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina, and
Georgia, to be free sovereign and independent States; that he treats
with them as such; and for himself, his heirs and successors, relinquishes all claims to the government, proprietary and territorial
rights of same, and every part thereof. 3

Joined together by the Articles of Confederation, these states
soon found that arrangement unworkable. In 1787 the Congress of
the Confederation issued the call for the convention that produced
our Co_nstitution. As conventions of the people met to ratify this
Constitution, the phrase "We the People" took on added meaning.
These acts of ratification constituted a partial transfer of authority,
of sovereign power, that had been ceded by the King of Englandthe transfer being from the people of the states to this new government. And it should be kept in mind, as was observed by a recent
witness before the Constitutional Amendments Subcommittee of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, that it was the partial delegation of
sovereign power that makes this a limited constitutional government, or stated differently, a government of limited power (singular)
rather than a government of limited powers (plural). There is no
limit on the powers that were delegated or granted except for the
3. Treaty of Paris, art. 1, 8 Stat. 81 (1783) (emphasis added).
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purposes or objects for which they were delegated, which purposes
are succinctly stated in the preamble.
Given this set of legal circumstances, under what conditions, then,
can the federal government interfere with the governmental structure of its constituent states? Did the act of the delegates of the
people in the various conventions as they ratified the Constitution in
each of the thirteen states mean that the very Constitution to which
they were giving life and purpose could later be used to deny the
people the right to determine how their own legislature could be
constituted? Furthermore, can anyone contend that subsequent
legislatures, ·when they ratified the fourteenth amendment, the conceptual basis for Reynolds v. Sims, would have done so had they
realized that they were signing their own death warrant? I doubt it.
There is only one circumstance, as I read the Constitution, which
authorizes the federal government to intrude or interfere with the
governmental structure of a state. That would occur under the provisions of section 4 of article IV, which, in pertinent part, state:
"The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican form of Government . . . ." This was the question, if
indeed there was a federal question, to be determined in the earlier
Baker v. Carr1 and the reapportionment cases. To rely on the fourteenth amendment for authority to establish by judicial decree a
new system of government for each of the fifty states is, first, to misread the history of that amendment and, second, to substitute
political theory for constitutional law. In fact, to proceed on the
theory of the Court is to ignore completely section 5 of that fourteenth article of amendment. I have often speculated to myself how
the Court could be unable for almost one hundred years to find a
means of enforcing the rights of individuals which were meant to be
protected by that amendment, having actually to rely in the end on
the Congress and its enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to achieve the purpose of the amendment, and then, in an almost casual manner, use power not expressed, implied, or intended in the amendment to strike down the
legislative structure of every state legislature in the fifty states. This
constitutes, I submit, an assumption of power by one branch of our
government that is unequaled in our nation's history.

II.

THE REAPPORTIONMENT CASES

Let me discuss for a minute some of the aspects of Reynolds v.
Sims, the principal case in the reapportionment cases, although I
4. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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feel that greater emphasis should be placed upon Lucas v. Fortyfourth General Assembly, 5 as it more clearly discloses the confrontation between the Court and the people and the willingness of the
Court to strike down the rights of a free people in order to impose a
political philosophy of the Court upon the country.
The Court, after distorting the fourteenth amendment so as to
justify the end it sought, proceeded to establish the following constitutional principles so far as the manner of structuring state legislatures is concerned:
Population is, of necessity, the starting point for consideration and
the controlling criterion for judgment in legislative apportionment
controversies.
. . . We hold that, as a basic constitutional standard, the Equal
Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis.<1

The principal response to the Court's pronouncements came
from Justice John Marshall Harlan. In his classic dissent in Reynolds
Justice Harlan observed:
Today's holding is that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires every State to structure its legislature so
that all the members of each house represent substantially the same
number of people; other factors may be given play only to the extent
that they do not significantly encroach on this basic "population"
principle. vVhatever may be thought of this holding as a piece of
political ideology-and even on that score the political history and
practices of this country from its earliest beginnings leave wide room
for debate (see the dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J., in Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266, 301-323)-I think it demonstrable that the
Fourteenth Amendment does not impose this political tenet on the
States or authorize this Court to do so.
Had the Court paused to probe more deeply into the matter, it
would have found that the Equal Protection Clause was never intended to inhibit the States in choosing any democratic method they
pleased for the apportionment of their legislatures. This is shown by
the language of the Fourteenth Amendment taken as a whole, by the
understanding of those who proposed and ratified it, and by the
political practices of the States at the time the Amendment was
adopted. It is confirmed by numerous state and congressional actions
since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, and by the common understanding of the Amendment as evidenced by subsequent
5. 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
6. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567-68 (1964).
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constitutional amendments and decisions of this Court before Baker
v. Carr, supra, made an abrupt break ·with the past in 1962.
The failure of the Court to consider any of these matters cannot
be excused or explained by any concept of "developing" constitutionalism. It is meaningless to speak of constitutional "development"
when both the language and history of the controlling provisions of
the Constitution are wholly ignored. Since it can, I think, be shown
beyond doubt that state legislative apportionments, as such, are
wholly free of constitutional limitations, save such as may be imposed by the Republican Form of Government Clause (Const., Art.
IV, § 4), the Court's action now bringing them within the purview of
the Fourteenth Amendment amounts to nothing less than an exercise
of the amending power by this Court.7
In his detailed review of the debates in Congress and in the state
legislatures over the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, Justice
Harlan established beyond any doubt the correctness of his observations. Having established this basis, Justice Harlan proceeded with
some observations on the effect of the Court's decision. In this connection it is well to consider these excerpts:
The Court's elaboration of its new "constitutional" doctrine indicates how far-and how unwisely-it has strayed from the appropriate bounds of its authority. The consequence of today's decision
is that in all but the handful of States which may already satisfy the
new requirements the local District Court or, it may be, the state
courts, are given blanket authority and the constitutional duty to
supervise apportionment of the State Legislatures. It is difficult to
imagine a more intolerable and inappropriate interference by the
judiciary with the independent legislatures of the States.
It should by now be obvious that these cases do not mark the
end of reapportionment problems in the courts....
Generalities cannot obscure the cold truth that cases of this type
are not amenable to the development of judicial standards. No set of
standards can guide a court which has to decide how many legislative
districts a State shall have, or what the shape of the districts shall be,
or where to draw a particular district line. No judicially manageable
standard can determine whether a State should have single-member
districts or multimember districts or some combination of both. No
such standard can control the balance between keeping up with
population shifts and having stable districts. In all these respects, the
courts will be called upon to make particular decisions with respect
to which a principle of equally populated districts will be of no
assistance whatsoever. Quite obviously, there are limitless possibilities
for districting consistent with such a principle. Nor can these problems be avoided by judicial reliance on legislative judgments so far
7. Id. at 590-91.
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as possible. Reshaping or combining one or two districts, or modifying just a few district lines, is no less a matter of choosing among
many possible solutions, with varying political consequences, than
reapportionment broadside.
. . . In one or another of today's opinions, the Court declares it
unconstitutional for a State to give effective consideration to any of
the following in establishing legislative districts:
(I) history;
(2) "economic or other sorts of group interests";
(3) area;
(4) geographical considerations;
(5) a desire "to insure effective representation for sparsely
settled areas";
(6) "availability of access of citizens to their representatives";
(7) theories of bicameralism (except those approved by the
Court);
(8) occupation;
(9) "an attempt to balance urban and rural power;"
(10) the preference of a majority of voters in the State.
. . . What is done today deepens my conviction that judicial entry
into this realm is profoundly ill-advised and constitutionally impermissible. As I have said before, Wesberry v. Sanders [376 U.S. I,
48], I believe that the vitality of our political system, on which in the
last analysis all else depends, is weakened by reliance on the judiciary
for political reform; in time a complacent body politic may result.
These decisions also cut deeply into the fabric of our federalism.
What must follow from them may eventually appear to be the product of state legislatures, Nevertheless, no thinking person can fail
to recognize that the aftermath of these cases, however desirable it
may be thought in itself, will have been achieved at the cost of a
radical alteration in the relationship between the States and the
Federal Government, more particularly the Federal Judiciary. Only
one who has an overbearing impatience with the federal system and
its political processes will believe that that cost was not too high or
was inevitable.
Finally, these decisions give support to a current mistaken view of
the Constitution and the constitutional function of this Court. This
view, in a nutshell, is that every major social ill in this country can
find its cure in some constitutional "principle," and that this Court
should "take the lead" in promoting reform when other branches of
government fail to act. The Constitution is not a panacea for every
blot upon the public welfare, nor should this Court, ordained as a
judicial body, be thought of as a general haven for reform movements. The Constitution is an instrument of government, fundamental
to which is the premise that in a diffusion of governmental authority
lies the greatest promise that this Nation will realize liberty for all
its citizens. This Court, limited in function in accordance with that
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premise, does not serve its high purpose when it exceeds its authority,
even to satisfy justified impatience with the slow workings of the
political process. For when, in the name of constitutional interpretation, the Court adds something to the Constitution that was deliberately excluded from it, the Court in reality substitutes its view
of what should be so for the amending process. 8

Before proceeding to the case with which I am most concerned,
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, a reference to the observations of Justice Frankfurter in his dissent in the earler case of Baker
v. Carr seems most appropriate. Seldom in the space of so little time
has the full force of an admonition been realized. In trying to warn
the Court of the consequences of their decision that an allegation of
unequal state legislative apportionment presents a justiciable question, Frankfurter advised:
The Court today reverses a uniform course of decision established
by a dozen cases, including one by which the very claim now sustained was unanimously rejected only five years ago. The impressive
body of rulings thus cast aside reflected the equally uniform course
of our political history regarding the relationship between population and legislative representation-a wholly different matter from
denial of the franchise to individuals because of race, color, religion
or sex. Such a massive repudiation of the experience of our whole
past in asserting destructively novel judicial power demands a detailed analysis of the role of this Court in our constitutional scheme.
Disregard of inherent limits in the effective exercise of the Court's
"judicial power" not only presages the futility of judicial intervention in the essentially political conflict of forces by which the relation
between population and representation has time out of mind been
and now is determined. It may well impair the Court's position as
the ultimate organ of "the supreme Law of the Land" in that vast
range of legal problems, often strongly entangled in popular feeling,
on which this Court must pronounce. The Court's authority-possessed of neither the purse nor the sword-ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction. Such feeling must be
nourished by the Court's complete detachment, in fact and in appearance, from political entanglements and by abstention from injecting itself into the clash of political forces in political settlements.
A hypothetical claim resting on abstract assumptions is now for
the first time made the basis for affording illusory relief for a particular evil even though it foreshadows deeper and more pervasive
difficulties in consequence. The claim is hypothetical and the assumptions are abstract because the Court does not vouchsafe the lower
courts-state and federal-guidelines for formulating specific, definite, wholly unprecedented remedies for the inevitable litigations
that today's umbrageous disposition is bound to stimulate in connec8. Id. at 615, 621·25.
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tion with politically motivated reapportionments in so many States.
In such a setting, to promulgate jurisdiction in the abstract is
meaningless. It is as devoid of reality as "a brooding omnipresence
in the sky," for it conveys no intimation what relief, if any, a District Court is capable of affording that would not invite legislatures
to play ducks and drakes with the judiciary. For this Court to direct
the District Court to enforce a claim to which the Court has over
the years consistently found itself required to deny legal enforcement
and at the same time to find it necessary to withhold any guidance
to the lower court how to enforce this turnabout, new legal claim,
manifests an odd-indeed an esoteric-conception of judicial propriety. One of the Court's supporting opinions, as elucidated by
commentary, unwittingly affords a disheartening preview of the
mathematical quagmire (apart from diverse judicially inappropriate
and elusive determinants) into which this Court today catapults
the lower courts of the country without so much as adumbrating
the basis for a legal calculus as a means of extrication. Even assuming
the indispensable intellectual disinterestedness on the part of judges
in such matters, they do not have accepted legal standards or criteria
or even reliable analogies to draw upon for making judicial judgments. To charge courts with the task of accommodating the incommensurable factors of policy that underlie these mathematical
puzzles is to attribute, however flatteringly, omnicompetence to
judges. The Framers of the Constitution persistently rejected a proposal that embodied this assumption and Thomas Jefferson never
entertained it.
We were soothingly told at the bar of this Court that we need
not worry about the kind of remedy a court could effectively fashion
once the abstract constitutional right to have courts pass on a stateside system of electoral districting is recognized as a matter of judicial
rhetoric, because legislatures would heed the Court's admonition.
This is not only a euphoric hope. It implies a sorry confession of
judicial impotence in place of a frank acknowledgment that there is
not under our Constitution a judicial remedy for every political
mischief, for every undesirable exercise of legislative power. The
Framers carefully and with deliberate forethought refused so to
enthrone the judiciary. In this situation, as in others of like nature,
appeal for relief does not belong here. Appeal must be to an informed, civically militant electorate. In a democratic society like
ours, relief must come through an aroused popular conscience that
sears the conscience of the people's representatives. In any event
there is nothing judicially more unseemly nor more self-defeating
than for this Court to make in terrorem pronouncements, to indulge
in merely empty rhetoric, sounding a word of promise to the ear,
sure to be disappointing to the hope.
"What, then, is this question of legislative apportionment? Appellants invoke the right to vote and to have their votes counted.
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But they are permitted to vote and their votes are counted. They
go to the polls, they cast their ballots, they send their representatives to the state councils. Their complaint is simply that the representatives are not sufficiently numerous or powerful-in short, that
Tennessee has adopted a basis of representation with which they are
dissatisfied. Talk of "debasement" or "dilution" is circular talk. One
cannot speak of "debasement" or "dilution" of the value of a vote
until there is first defined a standard of reference as to what a vote
should be worth. What is actually asked of the Court in this case
is to choose among competing bases of representation-ultimately,
really, among competing theories of political philosophy-in order
to establish an appropriate frame of government for the State of
Tennessee and thereby for all the States of the Union.
In such a matter, abstract analogies which ignore the facts of
history deal in unrealities; they betray reason. This is not a case in
which a State has, through a device however oblique and sophisticated, denied Negroes or Jews or redheaded persons a vote, or given
them only a third or a sixth of a vote. That was Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339. What Tennessee illustrates is an old and still
widespread method of representation-representation by local geographical division, only in part respective of population-in preference to others, others, forsooth, more appealing. Appellants contest
this choice and seek to make this Court the arbiter of the disagreement. They would make the Equal Protection Clause the charter of
adjudication, asserting that the equality which it guarantees comports, if not the assurance of equal weight to every voter's vote, at
least the basic conception that representation ought to be proportionate to population, a standard by reference to which the reasonableness of apportionment plans may be judged.
To find such a political conception legally enforceable in the
broad and unspecific guarantee of equal protection is to rewrite the
Constitution. See Luther v. Borden [7 How. 1 (1849)]. Certainly,
"equal protection" is no more secure a foundation for judicial judgment of the permissibility of varying forms of representative government than is "Republican Form." Indeed since "equal protection
of the laws" can only mean an equality of persons standing in the
same relation to whatever governmental action is challenged, the
determination whether treatment is equal presupposes a determination concerning the nature of the relationship. This, with respect to
apportionment, means an inquiry into the theoretic base of representation in an acceptably republican state. For a court could not
determine the equal-protection issue without in fact first determining the Republican-Form issue, simply because what is reasonable
for equal-protection purposes will depend upon what frame of government, basically, is allowed. To divorce "equal protection" from
"Republican Form" is to talk about half a question.
The notion that representation proportioned to the geographic
spread of population is so universally accepted as a necessary element of equality between man and man that it must be taken to
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be the standard of a political equality preserved by the Fourteenth
Amendment-that it is, in appellants' words "the basic principle of
representative government"-is, to put it bluntly, not true. However
desirable and however desired by some among the great political
thinkers and framers of our government, it has never been generally
practiced, today or in the past. It was not the English system, it was
not the colonial system, it was not the system chosen for the national
government by the Constitution, it was not the system exclusively or
even predominantly practiced by the States at the time of adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is not predominantly practiced by
the States today. Unless judges, the judges of this Court, are to make
their private views of political ·wisdom the measure of the Constitution-views which in all honesty cannot but give the appearance, if
not reflect the reality, of involvement with the business of partisan
politics so inescapably a part of apportionment controversies-the
Fourteenth Amendment, "itself a historical product," Jackman v.
Rosenbaum Go., 260 U.S. 22, 31, provides no guide for judicial oversight of the representation problem.
Manifestly, the Equal Protection Clause supplies no clearer guide
for judicial examination of apportionment methods than would the
Guarantee Clause itself. Apportionment, by its character, is a subject of extraordinary complexity, involving-even after the fundamental theoretical issues concerning what is to be represented in a
representative legislature has been fought out or compromisedconsiderations of geography, demography, electoral convenience, economic and social cohesions or divergencies among particular local
groups, communications, the practical effects of political institutions
like the lobby and the city machine, ancient traditions and ties of
settled usage, respect for proven incumbents of long experience and
senior status, mathematical mechanics, censuses compiling relevant
data, and a host of others. Legislative responses throughout the country to the reapportionment demands of the 1960 Census have glaringly confirmed that these are not factors that lend themselves to
evaluations of a nature that are the staple of judicial determinations
or for which judges are equipped to adjudicate by legal training or
experience or native wit. And this is the more so true because in
every strand of this complicated, intricate web of values meet the
contending forces of partisan politics. The practical significance of
apportionment is that the next election results may differ because
of it. Apportionment battles are overwhelmingly party or intra-party
contests. It will add a virulent source of friction and tension in federal-state relations to embroil the federal judiciary in them. 0

In the Lucas case the Court was called upon to do the very thing
that Justice Frankfurter anticipated the decision in Baker v. Carr
would ultimately require: the substitution of the Court's notions of
9. 369 U.S. at 266-69, 299-302, 323-24.
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representative government for those of the people m the governmental unit involved.

III.

THE COLORADO CASE: THE PEOPLE THWARTED

The factual situation in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly
was quite simple. It did not arise through any failure of the legislature to reapportion in the manner required by their state constitution as in Baker v. Carr or Reynolds v. Sims. Nor was there any
denial of the people's right to initiate reapportionment; on the
contrary, the people of Colorado did just that. Nor was the action
unilateral in that only one proposition was to be voted upon, for in
fact alternative proposals were presented to the people for a decision.
Senator Peter H. Dominick of Colorado, in testifying before the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, described the process
whereby the people of Colorado selected the plan of apportionment
that was found to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court:
Between 1876, the date of Colorado's admission to the Union,
and November of 1962, there had been seven major reapportionments in Colorado. Some were undertaken by its general assembly
and some by the people either by way of initiative or referendum.
Reapportionment was a much debated and thoroughly discussed
issue again in 1962 and in November of that year two initiated proposals were put on the ballot. Amendment No. 7 provided for the
members of the State house of representatives to be elected on a
strict population basis and for the members of the State senate to
be elected on the basis of population plus other relevant factors.
Amendment No. 7 was termed the Federal plan. Amendment No. 8
provided for the election of the members of both the house and the
senate on a strict population basis. Then the people of Colorado
voted and the results were convincing.
Amendment No. 7 was approved by a vote of 305,700 for and
172,725 against. Amendment No. 8 was defeated by a vote of 158,204
for and 349,195 against. Even more convincing is the fact that No. 7
was approved by a majority in every county in the State and No. 8
was rejected by every county in the State. You can imagine our feeling of frustration when the U.S. Supreme Court held No. 7 unconstitutional on June 15, 1964.
One of the points that I make by this is that the people of the
State of Colorado tried, by their own initiative-because this was
not a legislative proposal put out by the State legislature-both plans
were initiated by the voters-by their own initiative they tried to
make this a crystal-clear decision in our State.10
10. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Judiciary
Comm. on the Reapportionment of State Legislatures, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, 14 (1965).
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The senior Senator from Colorado, the Honorable Gordon
Allott, appearing in the same hearing expressed the further view
that:
"What I am saying is that in 1962 the people of Colorado, on an
initiated law, in every single county in the State, turned down the
theory which the Supreme Court has arrogated to itself under the
Sims decision by a vote of over 2 to I; and by a vote of almost 2 to 1
adopted the principle that our State has maintained throughout its
life since 1876. It was this constitutional provision which the Supreme Court struck down in its decision of June 15, 1964, in the
Colorado case.

If there is anything in the history of Colorado which can be described as a longstanding antipathy, the struggle between urban centers of population and the predominantly rural balance of the State
would fit this description. I can testify, Mr. Chairman, that the Colorado plan adopted by the voters, struck a reasonable balance between rural and urban interests, with neither group having a clear
overriding balance of power.
I agree, rather, with John Adams, who said in 1789, "The essence
of a free government consists in an effectual control of rivalries."
This we had in Colorado, our own solution worked out by our own
people, adopted in free elections and enshrined in our constitution.
Yet, after the voters had adopted this constitutional provision
and the legislature had implemented it, an opponent of the Federal
plan filed suit in the Federal Court for the District of Colorado,
claiming violation of his constitutional rights. The three-judge district court convened to hear the case, held that the Colorado plan
of apportionment was not violative of the U.S. Constitution, but
when the case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, the case was
reversed and remanded to the district court.
One of the significant things-now, the argument has been used
that geography does not vote and land does not vote. This is quite
true. And yet in our State we have such a diversity of economic interests that you really do not have any representation, adequate representation, of some of these economic interests unless you have an
apportionment of one house other than on the one-man-one-vote
theory.
Well, for example, in our State, in the eastern part you have a
heavy agricultural interest. And yet this agricultural interest is a very
divided one, which consists of two rnmpletely different types of agriculture-one of which is supplied by irrigation and in the irrigated
areas, and another one which is commonly referred to as dryland
farming, and the two of them are completely different types of agriculture and their interests are completely different.

March 1968]

Supreme Court and the People

851

Then as you move into the western part of the State, a line
roughly drawn through Denver, then southward to Pueblo and go
on south, you hit into a heavy industrial area. Then as you go west,
you get not only again into the different kinds of-different kinds
and types, of which there are two chief types of agriculture interests,
but then you get into the very complex questions, for example, of
reclamation and irrigation and power. Then you get into the question of mining, the development of coal, the development of oil
shale reserves. And these are very, very complex questions indeed.
So that if you do not have the various geographical divisions of
the State represented, I do not see how you can do it.
So I think in terms of certainly a large amount of geographybut I think also in terms of economic interests of the people of an
area. 11
Here, then, we had a situation where the people of a state, after
having proposed two plans of apportionment on their own initiative,
voting, incidentally, on a "one man-one vote" basis, made their own
determination as to how the two houses of their legislature should
be structured. By a two-to-one vote they adopted a plan analogous to
our federal plan; by almost the same vote they rejected a plan in
which both houses were to be apportioned on the basis of population. The proponents of the defeated plan still fully possessed the
right under the state constitution to initiate other plans at subsequent elections. Can there be any clearer example of a free people
exercising their rights as citizens of a republic? I can think of none.
How was this theretofore unchallenged right of the people treated
by the Supreme Court?
Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice Warren, after engaging
in what appears to constitute judicial mind-reading, observed:
Thus, neither of the proposed plans was, in all probability,
wholly acceptable to the voters in the populous counties, and the
assumption of the court below that the Colorado voters made a
definitive choice between two contrasting alternatives and indicated
that "minority process in the Senate is what they want" does not
appear to be factually justifiable.
He went on to state the Court's holding:
Manifestly, the fact that an apportionment plan is adopted in a
popular referendum is insufficient to sustain its constitutionality or
to induce a court of equity to refuse to act.
. . . We hold that the fact that a challenged legislative apportionment plan was approved by the electorate is ·without federal con-

n.

Id. at 91-93, 96.
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stitutional significance, if the scheme adopted fails to satisfy the
basic requirements of the Equal Protection Clause, as delineated in
our opinion in Reynolds v. Sims. And we conclude that the fact that
a practicably available political remedy, such as initiative and referendum, exists under state law provides justification only for a court
of equity to stay its hand temporarily while recourse to such a remedial device is attempted or while proposed initiated measures
relating to legislative apportionment are pending and will be submitted to the State's voters at the next election.12
In his dissent, Justice Clark recognized the existence of problems
in Lucas that were not present in Reynolds v. Sims. He explained his
refusal to go along with the majority as follows:
I would refuse to interfere with this apportionment for several
reasons. First, Colorado enjoys the initiative and referendum system
which it often utilizes and which, indeed, produced the present apportionment. As a result of the action of the Legislature and the use
of initiative and referendum, the State Assembly has been reapportioned eight times since 1881. This indicates the complete awareness
of the people of Colorado to apportionment problems and their continuing efforts to solve them. The courts should not interfere in such
a situation. See my concurring opinion in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 258-259 (1962). Next, as my Brother STEWART has pointed out,
there are rational and most persuasive reasons for some deviations
in the representation in the Colorado Assembly. The State has mountainous areas which divide it into four regions, some parts of which
are almost impenetrable. There are also some depressed areas, diversified industry and varied climate, as well as enormous recreational
regions and difficulties in transportation. These factors give rise to
problems indigenous to Colorado, which only its people can intelligently solve. This they have done in the present apportionment.
Finally, I cannot agree to the arbitrary application of tl1e "one
man, one vote" principle for both houses of a State Legislature. In
my view, if one house is fairly apportioned by population (as is admitted here) then the people should have some latitude in providing,
on a rational basis, for representation in the other house. The Court
seems to approve the federal arrangement of two Senators from each
State on the ground that it was a compromise reached by the framers
of our Constitution and is a part of the fabric of our national charter. But what the Court overlooks is that Colorado, by an overwhelming vote, has likewise ·written the organization of its legislative body into its Constitution, and our dual federalism requires
that we give it recognition. After all, the Equal Protection Clause
is not an algebraic formula. Equal protection does not rest on
whether the practice assailed "results in some inequality" but rather
on whether "any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that
12. 377 U.S. at 732, 736-37.
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would sustain it"; and one who attacks it must show "that it does
not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary."
In striking dmvn Colorado's plan of apportionment, the Court,
I believe, is exceeding its powers under the Equal Protection Clause;
it is invading the valid functioning of the procedures of the States,
and thereby is committing a grievous error which will do irreparable
damage to our federal-state relationship.13
It seems to me, however, that Justice Stewart in his dissent in

Lucas brought the problem into clearer focus than did any of the
other Justices. In order to be sure that his views are understood, it is
essential to examine the following excerpts from his opinion:
It is important to make clear at the outset what these cases are
not about. They have nothing to do with the denial or impairment
of any person's right to vote. Nobody's right to vote has been denied.
Nobody's right to vote has been restricted. Nobody has been deprived of the right to have his vote counted. The voting right cases
which the Court cites are, therefore, completely wide of the mark.
Secondly, these cases have nothing to do with the "weighting" or
"diluting" of votes cast within any electoral unit. The rule of Gray
v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, is, therefore, completely without relevance
here. Thirdly, these cases are not concerned with the election of
members of the Congress of the United States, governed by Article I
of the Constitution. Consequently, the Court's decision in Wesberry
v. Sanders, 376 U.S. l, throws no light at all on the basic issue now
before us.
The question involved in these cases is quite a different one.
Simply stated, the question is to what degree, if at all, the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits each sovereign State's freedom to establish appropriate electoral constituencies from which representatives to the State's bicameral legislative
assembly are to be chosen. The Court's answer is a blunt one, and,
I think, woefully wrong. The Equal Protection Clause, says the
Court, "requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state
legislature must be apportioned on a population basis."
After searching carefully through the Court's opinions in these
and their companion cases, I have been able to find but two reasons
offered in support of this rule. First, says the Court, it is "established
that the fundamental principle of representative government in this
country is one of equal representation for equal numbers of people...." With all respect, I think that this is not correct, simply
as a matter of fact. It has been unanswerably demonstrated before
now that this "was not the colonial system, it was not the system
cl10sen for the national government by the Constitution, it was not
the system exclusively or even predominantly practiced by the States
at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is not
13. Id. at 742-43.
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predominantly practiced by the States today." Secondly, says the
Court, unless legislative districts are equal in population, voters in
the more populous districts ·will suffer a "debasement" amounting to
a constitutional injury. As the Court explains it, "To the extent that
a citizen's right to vote is debased, he is that much less a citizen."
We are not told how or why the vote of a person in a more populated legislative district is "debased," or how or why he is less a citizen, nor is the proposition self-evident. I find it impossible to understand how or why a voter in California, for instance, either feels or
is less a citizen than a voter in Nevada, simply because, despite their
population disparities, each of those States is represented by two
United States Senators.
To put the matter plainly, there is nothing in all the history of
this Court's decisions which supports this constitutional rule. The
Court's draconian pronouncement, which makes unconstitutional the
legislatures of most of the 50 States, finds no support in the words
of the Constitution, in any prior decision of this Court, or in the
175-year political history of our Federal Union. With all respect, I
am convinced these decisions mark a long step backward into that
unhappy era when a majority of the members of this Court were
thought by many to have convinced themselves and each other that
the demands of the Constitution were to be measured not by what
it says, but by their own notions of wise political theory. The rule
announced today is at odds with long-established principles of constitutional adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause, and it
stifles values of local individuality and initiative vital to the character of the Federal Union which it was the genius of our Constitution to create.

I.
What the Court has done is to convert a particular political philosophy into a constitutional rule, binding upon each of the 50
States, from Maine to Hawaii, from Alaska to Texas, without regard
and without respect for the many individualized and differentiated
characteristics of each State, characteristics stemming from each
State's distinct history, distinct geography, distinct distribution of
population, and distinct political heritage. My own understanding
of the various theories of representative government is that no one
theory has ever commanded unanimous assent among political scientists, historians, or others who have considered the problem. But
even if it were thought that the rule announced today by the Court
is, as a matter of political theory, the most desirable general rule
which can be devised as a basis for the make-up of the representative
assembly of a typical State, I could not join in the fabrication of a
constitutional mandate which imports and forever freezes one theory
of political thought into our Constitution, and forever denies to
every State any opportunity for enlightened and progressive innovation in the design of its democratic institutions, so as to accommodate within a system of representative government the interests and
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aspirations of diverse groups of people, without subjecting any group
or class to absolute domination by a geographically concentrated or
highly organized majority.
Representative government is a process of accommodating group
interests through democratic institutional arrangements. Its function
is to channel the numerous opinions, interests, and abilities of the
people of a State into the making of the State's public policy. Appropriate legislative apportionment, therefore, should ideally be designed to insure effective representation in the State's legislature, in
cooperation with other organs of political power, of the various
groups and interests making up the electorate. In practice, of course,
this ideal is approximated in the particular apportionment system
of any State by a realistic accommodation of the diverse and often
conflicting political forces operating within the State.
I do not pretend to any specialized knowledge of the myriad of
individual characteristics of the several States, beyond the records in
the cases before us today. But I do know enough to be aware that a
system of legislative apportionment which might be best for South
Dakota, might be unwise for Hawaii with its many islands, or Michigan with its Northern Peninsula. I do know enough to realize that
Montana with its vast distances is not Rhode Island with its heavy
concentrations of people. I do know enough to be aware of the great
variations among the several States in their historic manner of distributing legislative power-of the Governors' Councils in New England, of the broad powers of initiative and referendum retained in
some States by the people, of the legislative power which some States
give to their Governors, by the right of veto or otherwise, of the
widely autonomous home rule which many States give to their cities.
The Court today declines to give any recognition to these considerations and countless others, tangible and intangible, in holding
unconstitutional the particular systems of legislative apportionment
which these States have chosen. Instead, the Court says that the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause can be met in any State
only by the uncritical, simplistic, and heavy-handed application of
sixth-grade arithmetic.
But legislators do not represent faceless numbers. They represent
people, or, more accurately, a majority of the voters in their districts
-people with identifiable needs and interests which require legislative representation, and which can often be related to the geographical areas in which these people live. The very £act of geographic districting, the constitutional validity of which the Court
does not question, carries with it an acceptance of the idea of legislative representation of regional needs and interests. Yet if geographical residence is irrelevant, as the Court suggests, and the goal is
solely that of equally "weighted" votes, I do not understand why
the Court's constitutional rule does not require the abolition of districts and the holding of all elections at large.
The £act is, of course, that population £actors must often to some
degree be subordinated in devising a legislative apportionment plan
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which is to achieve the important goal of ensuring a fair, effective,
and balanced representation of the regional, social, and economic
interests within a State. And the further fact is that throughout our
history the apportionments of State Legislatures have reflected the
strongly felt American tradition that the public interest is composed
of many diverse interests, and that in the long run it can better be
expressed by a medley of component voices than by the majority's
monolithic command. What constitutes a rational plan reasonably
designed to achieve this objective will vary from State to State, since
each State is unique, in terms of topography, geography, demography, history, heterogeneity and concentration of population, variety
of social and economic interests, and in the operation and interrelation of its political institutions. But so long as a State's apportionment plan reasonably achieves, in the light of the State's own characteristics, effective and balanced representation of all substantial
interests, without sacrificing the principle of effective majority rule,
that plan cannot be considered irrational.
Moving from the general to the specific, I think that the Equal
Protection Clause demands but two basic attributes of any plan of
state legislative apportionment. First, it demands that, in the light
of the State's own characteristics and needs, the plan must be a rational one. Secondly, it demands that the plan must be such as not
to permit the systematic frustration of the will of a majority of the
electorate of the State. I think it is apparent that any plan of legislative apportionment which could be shown to reflect no policy, but
simply arbitrary and capricious action or inaction, and that any plan
which could be shown systematically to prevent ultimate effective
majority rule, would be invalid under accepted Equal Protection
Clause standards. But, beyond this, I think there is nothing in the
Federal Constitution to prevent a State from choosing any electoral
legislative structure it thinks best suited to the interests, temper, and
customs of its people. 14

IV.

RECTIFICATION BY AM:ENDMENT: THE CONGRESSIONAL EFFORT

Having these reapportionment decisions and other factors in
mind, it becomes essential to determine what should be done. Before
discussing this aspect of the reapportionment problems, I would like
to make one observation in the hope that my mvn purpose and my
actions become perfectly clear. I would say, first, that it is not my
purpose in any way to express any feeling or preference for any plan
of apportionment. It is my purpose to try to restore to the people of
each state their right as a free people to express their preference as
to how their legislature will be structured and to do so in a free
election and then to have the preference of the majority prevail,
14. Id. at 744-51, 753.
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so long as that preference does not transgress the guarantee in section
4 of article IV. Any action that I take will be to further this purpose,
restoration of the right of self-determination to the people in each
state. I have no quarrel with population as the standard for apportioning both houses of a state legislature if that is what the people
want. Neither do I oppose the use of a so-called "federal system" in
another state if the people feel that such a system best meets the
needs of their state. What I am concerned with, and what I am trying
to insure, is that the system of apportionment that is to be used,
whatever form it may take, is one that has been selected by the
people and represents their choice and has not been selected for
them by the Supreme Court or any court.
I would say that we have reached a very critical juncture in our
federal-state relationship as a result of the reapportionment decisions. What a mockery the Court has made of the people's unchallenged right to vote and choose between plans of apportionmentor at least prior to Lucas it was regarded as an unchallenged right.
The Court has already determined that the only valid plan of apportionment that can be approved is one based on population alone.
All others are invalid. What a futile gesture a "no" vote would be in
opposing a plan of apportionment based on population alone: only
"yes" voters are to be counted. The Court closes its eyes to the fact
that in Colorado, Ohio, Michigan, California, and in fact in every
instance in which a plan calling for both houses to be apportioned
on the basis of population has been presented to a vote of the people
it has been rejected at the polls. In every instance in which there
has been a choice of plans, the people have selected a plan in which
one house is apportioned on population and the other on population and other factors. Today no state can deviate from the Courtimposed standard in apportioning its legislature. The people are
without a choice.
The question then becomes: "What do we do?" If we do nothing,
a standard developed by a federal court is imposed upon every state
and will remain as the only standard for apportioning the legislatures
of the fifty states, which standard will, I believe, eventually be imposed by the Court upon every other governing body in the country.10 The process is already well underway.
To meet this challenge to the authority of the people I have
15. Senator Dirksen's prediction seems to have been quite accurate. See Avery v.
Midland County, 36 U.S.L.W. 4257, 4260 (U.S. April 2, 1968) ("[Local government]
units with general governmental powers over an entire geographic area [are] not to be
apportioned among single-member districts of substantially unequal population.").
-Ed.
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sponsored a proposed amendment to the Constitution. It would, if
adopted, restore to the people some, but not all, of the rights they
exercised prior to the reapportionment decisions that began with
Baker v. Carr. The final draft that was voted on by the Senate reads
as follows:
JOINT RESOLUTION
Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States
to preserve to the people of each State power to determine the composition of its legislature and the apportionment ·of the membership
thereof in accordance with law and the provisions of the Constitution of the United States.
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each
House concurring therein), That the following article is proposed
as an- amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which
shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution
when ratified by-the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States
within seven years of its submission to the States by the Congress,
provided that each such legislature shall include one house be apportioned on the basis of substantial equality of population in accordance with the most recent enumeration provided for in section 2
of article I:
"ARTICLE"SECTION I. The legislature of each State shall be apportioned
by the people of that State at each general election for Representatives to the Congress held next following the year in which there is
commenced each enumeration provided for in section 2 of article I.
In the case of a bi-cameral legislature, the members of one house
shall be apportioned among the people on the basis of their numbers and the members of the other house may be apportioned among
the people on the basis of population, geography, and political subdivisions in order to insure effective representation in the State's
legislature of the various groups and interests making up the electorate. In the case of a unicameral legislature, the house may be
apportioned among the people on the basis of substantial equality
of population with such weight given to geography and political
subdivisions as will insure effective representation in the State's legislature of the various groups and interests making up the electorate.
"SECTION 2. A plan of apportionment shall become effective
only after it has been submitted to a vote of the people of the State
and approved by a majority of those voting on that issue at a statewide election held in accordance with law and the provisions of this
Constitution. If submitted by a bi-cameral legislature the plan of
apportionment shall have been approved prior to such election by
both houses, one of which shall be apportioned on the basis of sub-
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stantial equality of population; if otherwise submitted it shall have
been found by the courts prior to such election to be consistent with
the provisions of this Constitution, including this article. In addition to any other plans of apportionment which may be submitted
at such election, there shall be submitted to a vote of the people an
alternative plan of apportionment based solely on substantial equality of population. The plan of apportionment approved by a majority of those voting on that issue shall be promptly placed in effect." 16

The basic requirements of the proposed amendment are few. It
would require reapportionment of a state legislature following each
decennial census. In order to depart from a population standard for
apportionment in one house of the legislature, it requires that two
plans of apportionment be presented to the people so that they could
make their choice; one plan, however, must provide that both houses
use population alone as the basis for apportionment of membership
in both houses of the legislature. This amendment would insure
that the people would always be guaranteed their right of self-determination and that, when exercised, it could not be nullified by the
Court. In essence it would let the people choose how they are to be
governed. This proposal, although receiving a substantial majority
in the Senate, did not receive the necessary two-thirds as required by
article V and was rejected.
V.

THE CONVENTION METHOD: THE PEOPLE SPEAK

While this effort in Congress to propose an amendment to the
Constitution was underway, and it has been carried on from midsummer 1964 to the present, other forces were at work. They too
had as their objective, just as did our legislative effort, a restoration to
the people of their authority to determine the manner in which their
state legislature would be constituted. This objective would also be
accomplished through the adoption of an amendment to the Constitution, but one to be proposed by a constitutional convention
assembled for that purpose pursuant to the application of the state
legislatures. This effort is still underway, and I have every expectation that it will succeed.
The framers of the Constitution realized, as a result of the states'
experience with the amendatory process in the Articles of Confederation, the need for a process of amending the Constitution that could
not be used to thwart the will of the people. The delegates at
Philadelphia, as the debates indicate, had some difficulty in developing procedures that they felt sure would be responsive at all times in
16. S.J. Res. 103, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
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affording the protection they sought for the rights of the people.
Four proposals were considered at Philadelphia: Charles Pinckney
made his proposal on May 29; Edmund Randolph the same day;
William Patterson on June 15; and Alexander Hamilton on June 18.
The following account of the proceedings indicates the details of
the various proposals and the manner in which agreement was
finally reached.
Pinckney proposed the following:
If two thirds of the Legislatures of the States apply for the
same The Legislature of the United States shall call a Convention
for the purpose of amending the Constitution-Or, should Congress
with the Consent of Two Thirds of each house propose to the States
amendments to the same-the agreement of Two Thirds of the
Legislatures of the States shall be sufficient to make the said amendments Parts of the Constitution ... .17

As Pinckney explained it:
[This article] proposes to declare, that if it should hereafter
appear necessary to the United States to recommend the Grant of
any additional Powers, that the assent of a given number of the
States shall be sufficient to invest them and bind the Union as fully
as if they had been confirmed by the Legislatures of all the States. 18
Pinckney feared the requirement of unanimous consent to any
change, as found in the Articles, because "it is to this unanimous
consent, the depressed situation of the Union is undoubtedly
owing." 19
Randolph offered the following resolution according to Madison's notes: "Resd. that provision ought to be made for the
amendment of the Articles of Union whensoever it shall seem necessary, and that the assent of the National Legislature ought not to be
required thereto." 20 As recorded in Madison's notes, George Mason,
in defending this proposal, on June II, said:
[It would] be better to provide for them, in an easy, regular and
Constitutional way than to trust to chance and violence. It would
be improper to require the consent of the Nat'l. Legislature, because they may abuse their power, and refuse their consent on that
very account. The opportunity for such an abuse may be the fault
of the Constitution calling for amendmt.21
As various details of what is now article V were discussed and
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

3
3
3
1
1

THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

id. at 120.
id.
id. at 22.
id. at 203.

1787 601 (M. Farrand ed. 1966).
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agreed to, a motion was made by Govemeur Morris and Elbridge
Gerry to amend proposed article V so as to provide that a convention
for proposing amendments would be called on application of twothirds of the states. Madison, however, "did not see why Congress would not be as much bound to propose amendments applied
for by two-thirds of the States as to call a Convention on the like
application." 22 He had no objection to providing for a convention,
as he had previously indicated, but did foresee "that difficulties might
arise as to the form, the quorum &c. which in Constitutional regulations ought to be as much as possible avoided." 23 The motion to
amend so as to require a convention was worded in such a fashion as
to make it mandatory that Congress call a convention upon application by two-thirds of the states and was approved without dissent.
Perhaps it is difficult today for some to realize how highly the
rights of freedom and self-government were regarded by the delegates
assembled at Philadelphia. But after all, the treaty ending the
seven-year war that secured these rights had only been signed six
short years before the Philadelphia Convention convened. Now,
they were already in the process of devising a new system of government, delegating certain of these newly won rights and powers to a
federal republic. Uppermost in their mind was the question of how,
should it later be found necessary to do so, could rights and powers
be regained once they had been delegated. Finally, after considering
and rejecting two other proposals, they agreed upon the amendatory
language now found in article V.
Article V contains two means of proposing amendments to the
Constitution. The first provision requires that "[t]he Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose
Amendments to the Constitution." This is the procedure that we
have followed in proposing every amendment to the Constitution
that has been submitted to the states for ratification. But the delegates at Philadelphia did not feel quite certain that this language
alone completely insured the right of the people to change this basic
charter if they at a later date found it necessary to do so. The second
method of proposing amendments provides: "The Congress ... on
the application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States,
shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments" (emphasis added).
This method of proposing amendments has never been successfully
used, that is, successfully in the sense of compelling the calling of a
convention, but applications from state legislatures were primarily
22. 2 id. at 629.
23. 2 id. at 630.
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responsible for Congress' submitting the seventeenth amendment to
the states for ratification.
If one is to appreciate fully the situation that confronts us today,
it is essential to know just why this alternative procedure was agreed
upon and what it really means. Perhaps Chief Justice Warren had
something of this meaning in mind when, in the majority opinion
in Reynolds v. Sims, he observed:
State legislatures are, historically, the fountainhead of representative government in this country. A number of them have their roots
in colonial times, and substantially antedate the creation of our Nation and our Federal Government. In fact, the first formal stirrings
of American political independence are to be found, in large part,
in the views and actions of several of the Colonial legislative bodies. 24

The delegates at Philadelphia no doubt saw themselves as the "fountain-head of representative government" and perhaps realized that
they alone stood between the people and a federal government determined to become all-powerful. So the delegates decided upon this
safeguard to protect the rights of the people. They decided that
whenever the people felt that an amendment to the Constitution
was required they could not be denied by the Congress the right to
propose that amendment. Such an amendment would be proposed
by a convention assembled on the application of the legislatures of
two-thirds of the several states. The people would speak through
their state legislatures.
Today the people in thirty-two states have spoken. We now have
applications from that number of states for the calling of a constitutional convention. In several other states an application has been
approved by one house of the bicameral legislature. When two more
are received, the constitutional requirement of article V for the convening of a convention will have been met: applications of twothirds of the states will have been made to the Congress. These
applications are not to be regarded as petitions or entreaties of the
states imploring the Congress to call a convention. The Congress is
without choice.
That the Congress is without discretion in calling a convention
under such circumstances could not have been made clearer. The
language of the article admits of no other construction. Alexander
Hamilton in The Federalist No. 85 explained the meaning of this
provision to the people in an effort to secure adoption of the Constitution:
24. 377 U.S. at 564.

March 1968]

Supreme Court and the People

863

By the fifth article of the plan the Congress will be obliged, "on
the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states (which
at present amounts to nine) to call a convention for proposing
amendments, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as
part of the constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of threefourths of the states, or by conventions in three-fourths thereof."
The words of this article are peremptory. The congress "shall call
a convention." Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion of
that body. And of consequence all the declaration about their disinclination to a change vanishes in the air. Nor however difficult it
may be supposed to unite two-thirds or three-fourths of the state
legislatures, in amendments which may affect local interests, can
there be any room to apprehend any such difficulty in a Union on
points which are merely relative to the general liberty or security
of the people. We may safely rely on the disposition of the State
legislatures to erect barriers against the encroachments of the National authority. 2 ti

The situation existing today is precisely that visualized by the
delegates at Philadelphia. There has been an "encroachment of the
National authority" of almost unparalleled proportions. Consider,
if you will, how far the Supreme Court has intruded its federal
presence into state affairs, such intrusions coming as an adjunct of
the Reynolds decision: sections of state constitutions, which constitutions have been expressly approved by the people, have been declared by the Court to be invalid; state legislatures have been prohibited from performing any legislative act, not even their normal
legislative functions, other than one of apportionment; the votes of
the people on amendments to a state constitution have been declared
invalid; elected state officials have been stripped of office and new
elections ordered by the Court; legislative redistricting has been
performed by the Court; constitutionally prescribed terms of office
have been held invalid. All of these are the outgrowth of the Court's
political philosophy, imposing on the people a numbers game in
which the people become the numbers. In fact, one threat has been
made to use a computer to draw representation boundaries. Can
there be any doubt as to why the people through their state legislatures are exercising their residual authority through article V? With
the Congress unwilling to act, is there any choice, other than abject
surrender, remaining for the states? Yet there are a few in the Congress and elsewhere who would deny the states this unqualified right.
I would like to discuss some of the excuses which they offer as reasons
25. THE
added).

FEDERALIST

No. 85, at 593

a. Cooke ed. 1961)

(Hamilton) (latter emphasis
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for refusing to call a convention when the requisite number of
applications have been received.
VI.

SOME QUESTIONS AS TO THE PETITION-CONVENTION METHOD

It has been contended that the applications are not in "proper
form." Where in article V is there any reference to a "form" that
should be used by a state legislature in making such an application?
There is none. Nor has the Congress in the 180 years since the adoption of the Constitution, assuming arguendo that it has the power
to do so, seen fit to lay dmvn a form to be used by the legislatures.
It is not "form" that controls in this instance; it is content and
purpose. In every instance the applications call upon the Congress to
convene a constitutional convention for the purpose of proposing
an amendment to the Constitution. In every instance the applications
refer to the substance of the proposed amendment as being apportionment of state legislatures. Some even specify language to be
used. Nearly all give the Congress time to propose an amendment on
its mvn, declaring the application to be void if such an amendment
has been proposed by a date specified in the amendment.
Others have contended that some applications are invalid on
their face because the legislatures that adopted them were malapportioned. If by this curious line of reasoning some applications were
found-by a court, I suppose-to be invalid, then what happens to
the other acts of that legislature? How far back would one go? As
far back as the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, the vehicle
that the Court used to find the legislature unconstitutionally constituted? Fortunately, such emotional rhetoric can be answered by
referring to three cases: Texas v. White, 20 Dawson v. Bomar,21 and
Ryan v. Tinsley. 28 In Texas v. White, the Court was dealing with
what is called an "unlawful government," Texas having acquired
that status by virtue of adopting an ordinance of secession proposed
by the Texas convention and ratified by a majority of the citizens of
Texas. I cannot believe that those who challenge an application for
a convention made by a malapportioned legislature can seriously
contend that such was the act of an "unlawful government" or that
such acts were in furtherance or support of rebellion against the
United States, which criteria the Court applied in upholding certain
other acts of the Texas legislature. I doubt that those who challenge
26. 75 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868).
27. 322 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 933 (1964).
28. 316 F.2d 430 (10th Cir. 1963).
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these applications would contend that they constitute "treasonable"
or "rebellious" acts within the meaning of Texas v. White.
But a more immediate answer is provided in the Bomar case
where the constitutionality of certain acts of a malapportioned legislature was directly challenged. The pertinent part of that opinion is
as follows:
As indicated by the petitioner's failure to cite authority in support of his contention, the courts have uniformly held that otherwise valid enactments of legislatures will not be set aside as unconstitutional by reason of their passage by a malapportioned legislature.
This conclusion is reached upon one or more of three judicially
recognized doctrines: (1) the de jure doctrine which recognizes that
a legislative body created by a state constitution has a de jure existence which is not destroyed by any failure to redistrict in accordance
with the constitutional mandate; (2) the de facto doctrine which
recognizes that the legislative offices created by the state constitution
were de jure and the incumbents, even though elected under an invalid districting act, were at least de facto members of the legislature
and their acts as valid as the acts of the de jure officers; (3) the doctrine of avoidance of chaos and confusion which recognizes the common sense principle that courts, upon balancing the equities between
the individual complainant and the public at large, will not declare
acts of a malapportioned legislature invalid where to do so would
create a state of chaos and confusion.... For the court to select any
particular category of laws and separate them from other laws for
the purpose of applying either the de facto doctrine or the doctrine
of avoidance of chaos and confusion would in fact circumvent legal
principles in order to substitute the Court's opinion as to the wisdom, morality, or appropriateness of such laws.29

Likewise, in the Tinsley case the court rejected the argument that
malapportionment renders the legislature's acts invalid, noting that
"[i]f the petitioner's contentions are to be accepted, a malapportioned legislature could not pass a valid act of reapportionment." 30
Others have questioned the length of time in which an application may be considered as valid and binding. Some extremists have
urged that only those applications received during one Congress can
be regarded as valid. This contention has about as much substance
as would be one that urged that any amendment to be valid must be
ratified by three-fourths of the state legislatures or conventions
within the life of the Congress that proposed it. Article V is silent
as to the length of time in which applications for a convention will
be considered valid; it is silent also as to the length of time during
29. 322 F.2d at 447-48.
30. 316 F.2d at 432.
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which ratification may be had. Since the two actions are halves of the
same amending process, it would seem that a period of time that is
reasonable for one act to occur would also be a reasonable time for
the other. Congress some years ago considered the problem of how
much time could elapse between the date of submission of an
amendment for ratification and the date on which ratification by
three-fourths of the states was attained, and it considered seven years
to be a reasonable time. This time limitation on ratification was first
used when the eighteenth amendment was proposed and was challenged in Dillon v. Gloss.31
Citing United States v. Babbit, 32 Ex parte Yarbrough, 33 McHenry
v. Alford,34 South Carolina v. United States, 35 Luria v. United
States,36 and The Pesaro, 37 the Court in Dillon v. Gloss determined
that, under the language of article V, ratification must take place
within some reasonable time after the Congress proposed the amendment. The Court noted that the lack of express provision on this
point in the Constitution was not in itself controlling because with
the Constitution, as with a statute or other ·written instrument, what
is reasonably implied is as much a part of it as what is expressed. Developing the point further, the Court said:
We do not find anything in the Article which suggests that an
amendment once proposed is to be open to ratification for all time,
or that ratification in some of the States may be separated from that
in others by many years and yet be effective. We do find that which
strongly suggests the contrary. First, proposal and ratification are not
treated as unrelated acts but as succeeding steps in a single endeavor,
the natural inference being that they are not to be widely separated
in time. Secondly, it is only when there is deemed to be a necessity
therefor that amendments are to be proposed, the reasonable implication being that when proposed they are to be considered and
disposed of presently. Thirdly, as ratification is but the expression
of the approbation of the people and is to be effective when had in
three-fourths of the States, there is a fair implication that it must be
sufficiently contemporaneous in that number of States to reflect the
will of the people in all sections at relatively the same period, which
of course ratification scattered through a long series of years would
not do .... We conclude that the fair inference or implication from
Article Vis that the ratification must be within some reasonable time
after proposal.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921).
66 U.S. (I Black) 55, 61 (1861).
110 U.S. 651, 658 (1884).
168 U.S. 651, 672 (1898).
199 U.S. 437, 451 (1905).
231 U.S. 9, 24 (1913).
255 U.S. 216 (1921).
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Of the power of Congress, keeping within reasonable limits to
fix a definite period for the ratification we entertain no doubt. As
a rule the Constitution speaks in general terms, leaving Congress
to deal with subsidiary matters of detail as the public interests and
changing conditions may require; and Article V is no exception to
the rule. Whether a definite period for ratification shall be fixed
so that all may know what it is and speculation on what is a reasonable time may be avoided, is, in our opinion, a matter of detail
which Congress may determine as an incident of its power to
designate the mode of ratification. It is not questioned that seven
years, the period fixed in this instance, was reasonable, if power
existed to fix a definite time; nor could it well be questioned considering the periods within which prior amendments were ratified. 38

This reasoning by the Court leads me to conclude that applications
for a convention received by the Congress within a seven-year period
must, from a time period standpoint, be regarded as valid.
There have also been questions raised as to the power of the
Congress to limit or control a convention in what the convention
may propose in the way of amendments once it has been convened. My own study of the Constitution, cases, and constitutional
treatises leads me to conclude that the Congress is not entirely powerless. First, I apprehend that when the applications are for a stated
purpose or amendment-as they are in the present instancethen in effect the state legislatures, which alone possess the initiative in convening a convention, have by their own action take
the first step toward limiting the scope of the convention. It
would then remain for the Congress to implement this attempt
to limit the convention by making appropriate provision in its call.
But on the other hand, should the requisite number of state legislatures make application for a convention and each employ in their
applications the exact language of article V, "for the purpose of proposing amendments," I am not at all persuaded that the Congress
would possess any authority to define either the subject matter or
number of amendments that a convention convened pursuant to
such applications could propose. But is this question really of material significance? Or is it not more of a collateral issue? For in the
final analysis a convention is possessive of no more authority in
amending the Constitution than is the Congress. Neither, acting
alone, can amend the Constitution; they represent only one part of
the process. But I would defer my discussion of this facet of the problem to a subsequent section of this Article.
38. 256 U.S. at 374-76.
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VII.

CALLING THE CONVENTION:

CAN

[Vol. 66:8!17
THE CONGRESS

STILL IMPOSE ITS WILL?

The real problem will come, I believe, when we have thirty-four
of the current limited-form applications for a convention before the
Congress. Congress has already indicated its unwillingness to submit
an amendment on legislative reapportionment to the states for
ratification. Will the receipt of two more applications, so that the
requisite number is at hand, change this situation? Can we expect
the Congress then to act affirmatively to propose such an amendment
and, in so doing, incidentally avoid the requirement of calling a
convention? I am not that optimistic, but realizing the obligation of
my oath of office, I am prepared to take the steps necessary to insure
that the Congress complies with the mandate of article V insofar
as the calling of a convention is concerned.
When the thirty-fourth application for a convention has been
received, I am prepared to offer for immediate consideration a
Senate Joint Resolution calling such a convention. The resolution
will require only a simple majority in each house. Since the executive branch has no function in the amending process, the resolution
will not require presidential approval. I am advised that the precedents of the Senate make such a resolution one "of the highest
priority," displacing any other matter before the Senate. A draft of
such a resolution has already been prepared and, subject to final
revision, it is as follows:
Concurrent Resolution
Whereas, applications for the calling of a convention for proposing amendments to the Constitution relating to the manner in
which membership may be apportioned in the legislatures of the
several States have been made to the Congress by the legislatures
of the following States .... and
Whereas, such applications have been so made by the legislatures
of two-thirds of the several States; and
Whereas, the applications so made have the same purpose and are
reasonably contemporaneous with one another, all having been made
in the period 1963-1968; and
Whereas, Article V of the Constitution requires that the Congress
shall call a convention for proposing amendments to the Constitution on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the several
States: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring),
That pursuant to the applications referred to above and the requirement of Article V of the Constitution the Congress hereby calls
a Convention for the consideration of those applications, and the
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proposing by the Convention of such amendments to the Constitution of the United States upon the subject thereof as the Convention
may deem proper.
Sec. 2. (a) The Convention shall convene in Constitution Hall,
in the City of Philadelphia, in the State of Pennsylvania on
_________, 1969, and thereafter may adjourn to the City
of Washington, District of Columbia, for the conduct of its deliberations.
(b) Each State shall be entitled to be represented in the Convention by delegates or alternate delegates, selected in such number
and manner as such State shall prescribe, who shall serve as such
for such period, not exceeding two years, as the proceedings of the
Convention may require. Upon all questions placed before the Convention for determination by vote, each State shall be entitled to cast
a vote which in weight is equal to the number of Members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives to which that State is
entitled in the Congress of the United States.
(c) The Convention shall choose its own temporary and permanent officers, including a temporary President and temporary
Secretary; determine the qualifications of delegates and alternate
delegates to the Convention; adopt rules of procedure for the conduct of proceedings of the Convention and of any committees
established by the Convention; and take such other action as it
shall determine to be necessary or proper for the fulfillment of its
obligations. Proceedings of the Convention shall be conducted in
conformity with Robert's Rules of Order until such time as the
Convention shall adopt other rules of procedure for the conduct
of its proceedings.
(d) No business, other than the selection of temporary officers
of the Convention or the adjournment of its proceedings from day
to day, shall be transacted by the Convention unless a quorum is
present. Delegates qualified to cast the votes of twenty-six States
shall constitute a quorum of the Convention.
(e) The Convention shall keep a record of its proceedings. Upon
the completion of the proceedings of the Convention, such record
shall be transmitted by the President of the Convention to the Archivist of the United States.
Sec. 3. (a) Upon the selection of a permanent President of the
Convention, and a determination that a quorum of the Convention
is present, the President of the Convention shall transmit to the
Secretary of the Senate and to the Clerk of the House of Representatives written notice that the Convention has assembled for its
deliberations and that a quorum of the Convention is present, and
including the names of the permanent officers of the Convention.
All applications received by the Senate and the House of Representatives from legislatures of the States, before or during the proceedings of the Convention, for the calling of a convention to propose
amendments to the Constitution shall be transmitted promptly by
the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives, respectively, to the President of the Convention.
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(b) Upon the completion of the proceedings of the Convention,
the President thereof shall transmit to the Secretary of the Senate
and the Clerk of the House of Representatives in writing a notice
of the adjournment of the Convention and a statement concerning
the nature of any action duly taken by the Convention.
(c) It is the sense of the Congress that(!) Upon request made by the President of the Convention,
the President of the United States and the Congress should place
at the disposal of the Convention such facilities, personnel,
services, and information of the United States Government as
may be required for the performance of the functions of the
Convention; and
(2) The Government of the United States should provide for
the payment of an appropriate compensation to delegates and
alternate delegates to the Convention and to personnel employed
by the Convention for the performance of its functions, and for
the payment of all expenses (including expenses for travel and
subsistence incurred by delegates, alternate delegates, and other
personnel engaged in the performance of duties of the Convention)
reasonably incurred in convening the Convention, conducting
the proceedings of the Convention, and transmitting to the several
States any amendments to the Constitution which the Convention
may propose.
Sec. 4. (a) Upon the completion of its proceedings, the President of the Convention shall transmit to each of the several States
and to the Administrator of General Services any amendment to
the Constitution of the United States which the Convention shall
have duly proposed.
(b) Any amendment to the Constitution of the United States
relating to the manner in which membership may be apportioned
in the legislatures of the several States proposed by the Convention
shall take effect as an amendment to the Constitution of the United
States when it shall have been ratified, within seven years after the
date of its submission to the several States by the Convention, by
conventions in three-fourths of the several States.
Sec. 5. The Secretary of the Senate shall transmit to the chief
executive officer of each State, and to the presiding officer of each
House of the legislature of each State, a copy of this concurrent
resolution.

The circumstances today indicate that it will quite likely be
necessary to invoke cloture in order to terminate debate on this
resolution and proceed to a vote. Such an effort requires the vote
of two-thirds of the members present and voting, which, as I mentioned earlier, was not attainable on the reapportionment amendment itself. But the circumstances here are somewhat altered. The
language of article V admits of a determination to be made and
states that "whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it neces-
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sary, [Congress] shall propose amendments to this Constitution" (emphasis added). No such discretion exists under the alternative method
when two-thirds of the legislatures have made application for a convention. The applicable language of article V is "peremptory" to use
Hamilton's phrase. As he stated, "[t]he Congress shall call a convention. Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion of that body."39
The vote of a member for cloture will not then be on the question
whether an amendment on state legislative apportionment is "necessary" or even desirable. That decision has already been made by
two-thirds of the state legislatures as provided by article V. This
vote, be it one on cloture or on the resolution itself, will be on the
question of whether the oath of office that each member took as
required by article VI has any meaning to him.
Conceding that there may be a sufficient number who will refuse to act in accordance with the mandate of article V and the
requirements of their oath of office, are the states to be thus foreclosed from having the convention that article V assures them? I
think not. Legislative leaders of both political parties from a great
many of the state legislatures have discussed this very possibility
with me and there is agreement among a number of them as to
how they will proceed to obtain that which the Constitution guarantees them and which the Congress would deny them. Their
planned course of action is alarmingly simple: mandamus proceedings before the Supreme Court. It would constitute a bit of irony.
I must confess that I was skeptical, to say the least, when I
first heard the procedure described: a petition for a writ of mandamus compelling the Congress to perform a certain act, one of calling a constitutional convention, and if Congress refused to comply,
a request that the Court itself direct the calling of such a convention. This procedure when it was :first suggested to me seemed to
be based more on emotional response than legal principle. But I
listened to the arguments and then I did some research on my mvn.
I have gradually come to the conclusion that there is indeed a
great deal of merit to this position and some considerable amount
of law to support it.
The language in article V is clear; it is unambiguous; it admits
of but one construction: "The Congress . . . on the Application
of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a
Convention for proposing Amendments." Congress is given no discretion; it is not left free to determine the wisdom of the acts of
39. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 25.
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the legislatures; it cannot even inquire into their motives. If the
act to be performed admits of no discretion, it becomes ministerial
as Hamilton indicated. It would appear from a reading of history
that this was precisely the situation the delegates at Philadelphia
had in mind when they agreed upon this procedure in article V.
They were apprehensive that a federal administration might refuse to yield to the demands of the states for a change in the Constitution and made it clear that no discretion was reposed in the
Congress in the performance of this duty.
I know of no departure from the rule that the courts will compel the doing of purely ministerial acts. Consider what the Supreme
Court had to say in Marbury v. Madison:
The government of the United States has been emphatically
termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly
cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy
for the violation of a vested legal right.
. . . But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual
rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally
clear that the individual who considers himself injured, has a right
to resort to the laws of this country for a remedy.
. . . [W]hat is there, in the exalted station of the officer, which
shall bar a citizen from asserting, in a court of justice, his legal rights,
or shall forbid a court to listen to the claim, or to issue a mandamus,
directing the performance of a duty, not depending on executive
discretion, but on particular acts of congress and the general principles of law?
From these, and many other selections which might be made, it
is apparent that the framers of the constitution contemplated that
instrument as a rule for the government of courts as well as of the
legislature.40

True, we have here three coequal branches of government but
does that alter the principle in the least? Can the people of twothirds of the states, when they assert through their legislatures a
right secured by article V of the Constitution, be denied that right?
If so, then popular sovereignty would be dealt a serious, if not
mortal, blow. To deny this right would be to put to an end our
system of government by law. I do not believe that such a situation will or can be permitted to develop.
But there is one other aspect of this problem to be considered,
40. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163, 170, 179-80 (1803).
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to which I alluded earlier. It might properly be described as the
"safeguard" in article V and should serve to allay all of the fears
and alarms that have been expressed over what a constitutional
convention called by the Congress pursuant to article V could do.
More properly, or perhaps more realistically, it should be called
the "forgotten" section of the article. It is also clear and unambiguous: amendments to the Constitution, whether proposed by the
Congress or a convention, "shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as a part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in
three-fourths thereof, as the one or other Mode of Ratification may
be proposed by the Congress." Notwithstanding this clear language
providing for another step to be taken before any amendmentwhether proposed by the Congress or in a convention-becomes
a part of the Constitution, there are those who have stood on the
floor of the Senate and elsewhere asserting that a constitutional
convention would "destroy the Constitution" or "repeal the Bill
of Rights" and might take other such misguided steps. Such false
inflammatory statements serve only to confuse the public, not to
inform, to mislead rather than guide, and should not be used by
those who know, or should know, them to be false. The problem
is far too serious to be dealt with in any such manner. But there
it is, no amendment, whether it come as a result of congressional
action or convention, can become a part of the Constitution until
there has been affirmative action by thirty-eight state legislatures
or state conventions. Is any greater safeguard needed than this one?
I am convinced that it is ample, that the delegates acted wisely in
providing it as a protection against ill-considered proposals, but one
which yet permits change to occur when the need is clearly indicated, as it surely would be whenever these procedures are met.
That is where we stand today.
VIII.

EPILOGUE

We have reached an historic point in the continuing process
of refinement and development of the basic document which gave
us a republic and which guarantees to each state a republican form
of government. The process of change, as the people would have
change, has been halted by the Supreme Court. The right of the
people to exercise the highest function that is theirs under our form
of government, that of deciding how (not by whom) they shall be
governed, has been taken from them. There are two ways in which
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this right can be restored. One, of course, is the reversal of the reapportionment decisions by some future Court. The other is by an
amendment to the Constitution. In the meantime the people are
powerless to make any change in their form of state government,
powerless to deviate in any manner from this court-imposed doctrine of representation, no matter how great the desire for change
may be. Such has been the effect of the reapportionment decisions
of June 15, 1964. These decisions, along with other recent ones,
lead me to conclude that the Court, if allowed to continue unchecked, will proceed to destroy that which it seeks to protect.

